Nash Equilibrium Toilet Seat

An interesting paper about the game theory analysis of leaving down the toilet seat.

http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/856/

This article brings up an interesting point about equilibrium in a game. It talks about how in theory leaving the toilet seat up may minimize the amount of times it ever needs to be moved and in general be the most effective and dominate strategy. But it also argues that because woman will yell at men for leaving the seat up that the man will disband from such actions even though it is technically the most work effective answer to the given problem. So does the fact that differnt people view negative results in different ways effect whether or not they continue to play with their dominant strategy?

In this case the yelling (from the woman) is perceived as a cost so it is taken into account and affects the equilibrium (especially since the cost of the yelling is much greater than that of inconvenience of having to put the toilet seat down)
So here the opinion led to a cost but there are many cases in which people have pinions but they do not necessarily relate to/affect you personally (they do nothing about it) so their opinions don't become costs and the dominant strategy doesn't change.